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of a middle-class (Anikin, 2009; Golenkova, Igitkhanan and Orekhova, 
2010; Golovlyanitsyna, 2009; Gorskov, 2011, 2012; Lapin, 2011; 
Tichonova, 2007; Tichonova and Mareeva, 2009; Yavlinsky and Kosmynin, 
2011). Basing on these works, I define a ‘new middle-class’ as a part of Rus-
sian middle-class which is engaged in the sphere of informational production 
and, accordingly, is actively embedded in various social networks and net-
work communities. I attribute to this class those involved in innovational 
practices, ie those who is capable to take decisions and to assume the re-
sponsibility for them; those who prepared to creative activity beyond the 
prescribed norms and procedures. The crucial point is that the expectations 
of this class could not be met by existing regime.  
‘New middle-class’ is mostly represented by young people (20-35 
years old), who lived in Moscow and some largest cities of Russia. As a rule, 
they grew in families in which both parents have a higher education. Mem-
bers of this class are engaged in science, education, private business or in 
various NGOs, though this fact is usually missed by the majority of re-
searches of social stratification. But this is a principled fact because in the 
cases of social conflicts these NGOs are often transformed into the SMOs, 
that is, into the nuclei of protest movements. Among the meeting attendants 
one could observe a lot of liberal professionals. It is indicative that nearly a 
half of the ‘new middle-class’ were jobless or were forced to became blue-
color workers during the crisis of 2008-09s. These people are politically ac-
tive because have a risk to repeat this sad experience of ’downshifting’ in the 
run of forthcoming economic crisis. They are politically active for the reason 
that their satisfaction in their labor and quality of life are the lowest among 
all categories of modernizing countries in the world (Lapin, 2011).  
It is necessary to distinguish this ‘new middle class’ from another 
new specific middle-class which shaped in 1990s at the expense of extra-
income from the selling of natural resources. This class is a kind of service-
class subjected to the ruling elite (Yavlinsky and Kosmynin, 2011).    
 
3. Shifts in national and global contexts 
The said mistrust is both tightly bound with turbulent context, na-
tional and global. The looming second wave of the economic crisis; entry 
into the WTO, which is fraught with complete conversion of a good many 
branches of economy; the volatility of exchange rates and other uncertainties 
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in economic sphere. The situation at the world political arena is not promis-
ing as well. A series of ‘colour revolutions’ and coups in North Africa and 
ex-Soviet countries as well as the ‘Occupy Wall Street!’ movement still 
troubling the Russian establishment. Next, the growing threat to Russia from 
the south brought about by the anticipated withdrawal of the NATO contin-
gents from Afghanistan; the mounting political frictions with the UNO and 
leading Western powers engendered by Russia’s position in relation to Syria; 
smaller-scale but sensitive frictions with China and Japan. On the whole, the 
geopolitical map of the world into which Russia is embedded, is changing 
actually before our very eyes. Russia is presently holding firm to Europe by 
its ‘oil sleeves’, but for how long? [1]. 
Home affairs are lacking stability too. I spoke about the burden of 
past problems in my previous paper (Yanitsky, 2011). However, during 
the ‘fatty years’, when the working population’s living standards were 
improving and any conflict could be put out using oil dollars, society 
seemed to be more or the less homogenous because the greater majority of 
the people accepted the public contract offered by the government: ‘we 
pay you, and you do not interfere in our affairs’. Besides, the mass media 
had been inculcating an idea upon Russian society that the superrich live 
in a world of their own and all the rest live separately from them. As long 
as the population’s welfare was on the rise, such social order appeared to 
be legitimate and even natural. But the past and forthcoming crises raised 
the degree of public  dissatisfaction: why has it fared ill only with us while 
they fare well as before? Here a great role was played by the proliferation 
of living on credit to which the Russians had been absolutely unprepared 
and because of which a large number of borrowers who lost their money 
and health joined the ranks of those who were socially concerned and irri-
tated. 
In the run of protest actions it is became clear that contemporary 
Russian society has long been split into numerous antagonistic groups: the 
large city’s residents vs. those who lives in the provinces; the ‘new middle 
class’ vs. the adherents of stability; the TV-people vs. the Internet-people; 
the internationalists-democrats vs. the patriots-statists, responsible national-
ists vs. ultra-nationalists, and so on. And each of these groups has serious 
claims on the government. All in all, Russian society is divided into two 
large groups. The major part of Russian society is budgetniki, ie people who 
lives on salary. Except high-ranked managers, the majority of them are poor, 
ill-educated and immobile workers and civil servants (office employee), who 
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lived in numerous decaying small towns and villages in the depth of the 
country [2]. A subgroup stands close to them is the wasted people: drunk-
ards, drug addicts, spongers, tramps and hobos. The former’s fear of the fu-
ture and the latter’s dissatisfaction with their existence sharpen the general 
feeling of uncertainty. Since they both live under the sign ‘let it not be 
worse’, they are the partisans of the idea of stability. 
In institutional terms, military-industrial complex, oil-gas, and agri-
cultural complexes, regular forces and so called independent trade unions are 
the stronghold of Russian conservators. As Igor Jurgens, the director of the 
Institute of modern development, stated, ‘their <leaders> perceived the very 
word “modernization” as something hateful for them’ (Jurgens, 2012: 13). 
The true ‘new middle class’ is displeased at the absence of social lifts and 
opportunities for opening private businesses, corruption and all-round bu-
reaucratization of social life that hamper their social progress and making a 
decent living in general. The idea of ‘normal life’ and honest labour are ac-
centuated in the political discourse of this advanced group. 
Honest labour is very important notion in Russian culture. From pre-
Soviet times onwards, honest labour meant work in strict accordance with 
particular technological norms and standards, without deception, delays, and 
without all that what might be called a ‘symbolizing work’ (a kind of sym-
bolic behaviour) which today became widespread in Russia. Recently, hon-
est labour practically ceased to be a measure of individual wellbeing and a 
source of public good having been ousted by the practice of goods and bene-
fits distribution by the employers. The whole atmosphere produced by media 
and corrupted business tells to the young people that it is much easier to 
swindle, to steal, to bereave, to catch property belonged to somebody else by 
sheer force even to merry advantageously, etc., than to earn money by honest 
everyday labour. 
 Labour remuneration as an economic category was replaced by 
payment for service and loyalty to the boss or political regime, that is, by a 
political category, and at the same time made into a criterion of promotion 
up the social ladder. This shift also entailed gradual cancellation of eco-
nomic and social remunerations for past employment. Honest labour as a 
pledge of social recognition and promotion up the social ladder shrank to the 
minimum which produced an additional source of dissatisfaction and irrita-
tion.  
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Inadequate performance of the labour institution and its derivates 
(trade unions, technical safety services) is to a great extent accountable for 
the accumulation of social unrest and psychological tension. The growing 
number of accidents and disasters, non-motivated acts of violence and mur-
ders, large-scale adulteration of foodstuffs and drugs, and, what is most im-
portant, the endless chain of fraud and extortion cases in financial and other 
spheres – all this taken together means that no safe places have been left in 
the everyday life space; there remain only more or less dangerous places. 
Finally, two sociopsychological factors of dissatisfaction should be 
mentioned. The former is that the gestalt of the ‘favourite leader’ shattered 
and even those who loved it got bored with it (Radzichovsky, 2012). Taking 
into consideration the age-old Russian tradition to sacralise supreme author-
ity, its delegitimisation is a very serious destabilizing factor. The latter is 
mistrust again. The government simply stopped paying attention to it. ‘…So 
many stillborn empty slogan-like campaigns have been engineered be the 
rulers over the past decade: “modernisation”, “commercialisation”, “trans-
formation”, “intellectualisation”, “nano-technolisation”’ (Gurevich, 2011: 
16). But How will all this improve people’s sociopsychological well-being 
had not been addressed at all. 
 
 
4. Accumulation of a critical mass of protest 
 
An illusion persisted in Russia that if something had not been shown 
on central TV, it not happened at all. Two events put a stop to wishful think-
ing: forest and peat fires in Central Russia which TV could not keep silent 
about, and arrangement of aid to victims via the Internet, which boosted the 
potency of networking and, what is even more important, imparted a new 
quality to it (Yanitsky, 2011a). The internet has made public the govern-
ment’s incapacity and reluctance to perform its functions. 
And so the protest movement started to expand steadily beginning in 
2010. At first, there emerged small seats of protest, then protestors began to 
unite into regional and local coalitions and, finally, series of mass protest 
meetings combusted in Moscow, St. Petersburg and other large cities [3]. 
The general trend: transformation of social, environmental and others civic 
protests into political ones [4]. Another feature: their network affiliation, to 
which the traditional Russian power vertical had been absolutely unprepared. 
